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Introduction
The focus of this paper is on the effects on ports of the closer integration that is
developing in the maritime and port industries. Relationships in these industries include
joint ventures, mergers, strategic alliances and cartel agreements in which shipping
companies feature prominently. The resulting development of closer integration has
uncertain effects on the competitive position of ports and on their response to the
changing environment. To what extent, for example, will the relationship of liner
shipping companies and port authorities change? Are port authorities responding
similarly or differently to the new challenges?
The developments and the questions arising from closer integration have global
relevance. However, the specific effects on ports and the responses of ports to them are
influenced by regional or national conditions. In this paper, after examining the
different forms of co-operation among liner shipping firms on a global basis, the
emphasis is on developments in Europe. These developments include the interests of the
liner companies in ports and inland transport, the interests of the various enterprises
involved in port activities and, finally, the consequences of organisational changes for
port competition in Europe.
Co-Operation Agreements Affecting Liner Shipping: An
Overview
The liner shipping market used to be a classic example of an oligopoly: it was a market
with a limited number of large shipping companies, often united in cartels, dealing with
a large number of inadequately informed shippers who had little influence on tariffs and
conditions of carriage. But today, many shippers have developed into large concerns,
often possessing more relevant market information than the shipping companies. They
have, in other words, become much stronger players in the liner shipping market.
However, the reality of enterprises affecting the liner market is more complex than that.
There are players other than shippers and shipping companies involved, for example,
stevedores and port authorities. Moreover, the interests and objectives of the market
players have evolved. There appears to be a strong economic incentive to acquire direct
control over an ever-larger part of the logistics chain. It used to be the case that liner
companies faced competition mainly from other liner companies; even that was largely
restricted to the maritime part of operations. Today, the competitive struggle goes much
further, so that attention is also due to cargo handling, hinterland transportation and
even other logistics services.
Table 1 offers a brief overview (with examples) of the kind of co-operation agreements
that have been established in recent years between the predominant maritime market
players (shipping companies, stevedores, hinterland transport modes, and port
authorities).
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 Alliances and mergers among shipping lines
Co-operation agreements exclusively involving shipping companies can take various
forms. First and foremost, there are the major strategic alliances. The first such alliance,
the so-called Global Alliance, was set up in 1994 by APL, OOCL, MOL and Nedlloyd.
The objective was to establish an integrated Europe – Far East service (Stopford, 1997,
p. 337).
Things developed rapidly after the establishment of this first alliance. Today, in mid-
1999, just about all global carriers are involved in global alliances, ie. partnerships
whereby the carriers involved are able to integrate their vessel operational activities.
Marketing operations and internal organisation, by contrast, are integrated to a much
lesser degree. Of the top-10 shipping companies, only Evergreen and Mediterranean
Shipping Company (MSC) are independent operators today.
The alliances among lines have continued to evolve. (Meersman, Moglia and Van de
Voorde, 1999). First, other alliances have been formed.  The United Alliance, involving
Hanjin, DSR-Senator and Cho Yang was formed in October 1997; activities started in
March 1998.  Second, there was the reorganisation of the two most important global
alliances, ie. the Grand Alliance and the Global Alliance, due to the creation of P&O
Nedlloyd (January 1997) and the takeover of APL by NOL (April 1997).  These
mergers took place mergers to rationalise activities, reduce costs, and create significant
economies of scale, all of which are conducive to establishing a major market player.
The new Grand Alliance (with the entrance of OOCL and MISC) and the New World
Alliance became operational in January 1998.
 
 Shipping conferences
Besides these rapidly changing corporate relationships among lines, there have also
been a number of important cartel agreements, mostly in response to excess loading
capacity and shipping companies suffering substantial losses, even with the existing
conferences. A typical example was the Transatlantic Agreement (TAA), which became
operational in 1993. It was an agreement by which the major shipping companies
wanted to gain tighter control of seriously loss-making shipping on the North Atlantic.
They tried to achieve this by determining rates, capacity supply and conditions of
freight by mutual arrangement.
Shippers, who were having difficulties securing loading capacity and could no longer
negotiate terms with individual shipping companies, soon responded. In 1994, the TAA
was banned by the European Commission on the basis of allegations of rate
manipulation, criticism of its capacity management and the fact that cartel agreements
also held for pre- and on-carriage over land. Also in 1994, the European Commission
imposed fines on a group of 14 shipping companies - European and Asian members of
the Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) - for illegitimate price fixing and
discriminatory practices.
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 Table 1: Co-operation agreements between various market players
MARKET PLAYERS SHIPPING COMPANIES STEVEDORES HINTERLAND
TRANSPORT
PORT AUTHORITIES
SHIPPING COMPANIES Þ Vessel sharing agreements
Þ Joint Ventures
Þ Conferences
Þ Consortia
Þ Strategic (global) alliances
(eg. Grand Alliance, New
World Alliance)
Þ Cartel agreements
Þ (eg. TAA)
Þ Mergers
   
 STEVEDORES Þ Financial stake of shipping
company in stevedore (eg.
CMB in Hessenatie,
Nedlloyd in ECT)
Þ Joint ventures (eg. MSC
and Hessenatie in Antwerp)
Þ (Dedicated terminals) (eg.
ECT Maersk in Rotterdam)
Þ Participation in capital
(eg. Hutchison
Whampoa in ECT, PSA
in Voltri Genova)
  
 HINTERLAND-
TRANSPORT MODES
Þ Block trains and capacity
sharing (eg. from
Rotterdam to Italy)
Þ Alliances (eg. CSX with
DB and NS)
Þ Joint ventures (eg. in
Antwerp between
NMBS and Noordnatie
for operating of a
terminal)
Þ Takeover strategy of
railway companies
(eg. DB and NS
cargo, NMBS and
THL)
 
 
 PORT AUTHORITIES Þ (dedicated terminals) (cf.
land-use and concession
policy)
Þ Financial stakes port
authorities (eg. 30%
ECT by Rotterdam,
ECT in Trieste, Sea-ro
in Zeebruges)
Þ Antwerp in Rijn
shipping terminal of
Germersheim
Þ Alliances (eg. Rotterdam and
Vlissingen, Antwerp and
Zeebruges)
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The involvement of shipping companies in terminal management
 
Meanwhile on land, an important development is unfolding in cargo handling
operations at container terminals. In the U.S., some shipping lines have operated there
own dedicated terminals for many years but in Europe this development is only now
taking place. Recent examples are Evergreen in Taranto, Italy, and Maersk in
Rotterdam. In Antwerp, the operation of a new container terminal was awarded to a
consortium consisting of a stevedore (Hessenatie) and a shipping company (MSC).
 Evidently, shipping companies are becoming increasingly influential in cargo handling.
They are seeking greater responsibility for the service and cost levels associated with
terminals as a part of their strategy to gain greater control over the total door-to-door
movement of freight. A consequence of this trend is a shifting balance of power in the
market, with increasingly large shipping companies exerting more control. It is quite
striking in this respect that even the de facto monopoly cargo handler ECT in Rotterdam
eventually had to yield to the demands of Maersk.
 Extending interests in inland transport
 
The extending of interests into other parts of the transport system is also evident in
inland transport. In 1994, for example, the Scheldt Container Terminal North in
Antwerp, the second container terminal down river to the port’s locks, was dedicated to
a partnership between the stevedoring company Noordnatie and the Belgian railway
company NMBS. Both partners regard the financial participation by the railways to be a
guarantee for solid operational co-operation, among other things in the deployment of
block trains. However, rival players claim that the co-operation distorts competition,
certainly while NMBS holds a monopoly on rail transport in Belgium.
Shipping companies are also becoming increasingly interested in the hinterland
transportation sector. Increasing control over hinterland transportation fits into the lines’
philosophy of providing a door-to-door transport service. Shipping companies are now
trying to gain greater control over hinterland transportation by sharing capacity on
goods trains out of ports (eg. Rotterdam-Italy).
The relationships of the shipping lines with inland transport have been complicated by
the dispute with the European Commission. The Commission allows shipping
conferences to fix rates for carriage by seabut disallows collective exemptions from the
rules of free competition for land transport. The features and the rates of such transport
services are determined on an individual basis. This will only change in the future (in
the shape of individual exemptions) if it can be demonstrated that freight rates set
collectively are advantageous to consumers.
 
 Overview of integrative arrangements
 
Shipping companies are the most active of the firms entering into co-operative
agreements. Table 1 shows quite clearly that co-operation agreements involving
shipping companies are much more numerous than those between other organisations.
These include the co-operative agreements between stevedores and operators in inland
transportation, usually involving shared financial responsibilities.
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The organisations in the co-operative agreements have various interests. At a broad
level, these include the economies of scale possible through increasing the volume of
freight moved on a particular route, spreading fixed costs of firms over a greater total
traffic and serving shippers more effectively. The improvements in services can be
achieved through the extent of lines’ networks better suited to the needs of shippers
with global interests and through the better integration of door-to-door services.
However, the strategies of particular organisations are complex and need to be
examined in more detail.
Market Behaviour In A Port Environment
Before turning attention to the consequences of shipping lines’ co-operative agreements
on ports, it is necessary to examine the strategic interests of market players in the port
industry. The major market players involved in port activities (shipping companies, port
authorities, stevedores, and inland transport modes) constitute a heterogeneous group.
At first glance, they would appear each to have their own objectives, to have specific
tools at their disposal, and to have a different impact on the port industry. But is this
really the case?
Table 2 is a schematic that shows how the heterogeneity of port activity is reflected in a
diversity of market players, each with their own objectives, tools and impacts. Very
complex processes influence the behaviour of the market players and their impact. Take
a shipping company, for example. The profit-seeking objective of a shipowner may be
pursued in various ways but, broadly, through cost reduction, service enhancement and
pricing strategies. To reduce costs, firms may follow various strategies. They may
pursue economies of scale through the use of larger vessels, limit the number of ports of
calls for ships, seek high utilisation of capacity and spread corporate fixed costs over
greater output. Alliances and mergers can contribute to these ends as firms compete for
volume (ie. market share). Lines may also try to increase profitability through strategies
that concurrently increase the scope of services provided to shippers and increase their
initial market share. Horizontal mergers and alliances enhance service quality for
shippers by increasing the geographical span of services. This is consistent with
shippers’ interests in using fewer lines to serve global markets. Vertical mergers and
alliances may enhance lines’ capability to provide well-integrated transport and logistics
services. The greater market share of lines realised through mergers and alliances may
also create some initial heightened market power, but this is unlikely to result in
sustained high profit margins in the dynamically competitive international shipping and
logistics industry.
These developments have direct effects on other market players, including port
authorities. The consequences include: the accessibility problems caused for certain
ports by increasing ship size; the reduction of the number of ports of call associated
with the rationalisation of sailing schedules; the greater negotiating power of alliances
and consortia; and the efforts of lines to acquire so-called dedicated terminals. What is
the potential impact on port competition? And to what extent do port authorities remain
important negotiating partners within the industry?
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The response of the port authorities is influenced by their ownership structure and, in
the case of public ports, by the objectives set for them by the community. Private ports
have a primary interest in maximising profits but must serve the trade well to maintain
their market share. Public ports are concerned with serving trade efficiently as a means
of maximising trade and economic benefits to the community. The instruments
available to ports are constrained by their actual authority. For public ports, they are
confined generally to investments in access and infrastructure and to concession
policies with terminal operators. These policies are important to the stability of
establishments over time and, therefore, to their efficiency. The public port authorities
try to minimise costs associated with goods handling and delays but they have limited
control. They are able to determine port dues but only have partial control over the
significant cost factor, time. This is affected by maritime accessibility that they
influence, but they have less influence on the more critical factors of ship turn-around
time and cargo-handling rates. Port authorities may play a role in labour relations
matters and aid in achieving socio-economic stability
However, increasingly the efficiency of ports is determined by other market players,
including stevedores, inland carriers, forwarders and agents. For each of these players,
the business objective is centred on the maximisation of profits. Long-term customer
loyalty and a sufficiently large market share can contribute to attaining this goal. Each
player has particular tools available that have effects on other port activities, eg. the
striving among terminal operators towards economies of scale, the fierce competition in
hinterland transportation, the dependency of forwarders and shipping agents on a
limited number of customers.
Freight forwarders have traditionally played an important role in international trade
acting as middlemen between the owners of the goods and the carriers. However, the
range of services offered by forwarders has expanded as shippers have sought more
sophisticated logistics services. Nevertheless, their position is being challenged by the
ability of shipping lines to provide more effective door-to-door service and to add more
value-added logistics services. Forwarders are also facing greater competition from
stevedores that are diversifying their services.
The complex set of interests illustrated by Table 2 makes uncertain how co-operation
will develop and how deep it will be. Further, the reasons for co-operation remain
speculative. How far may they be inspired by economic rationality, for example efforts
to realise economies of scale rather than merely obtaining more power and control over
the logistics chain? The latter may, in the longer term, lead to manifestations of
monopolistic behaviour.
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 Table 2:  Objectives, tools and impact
 
 MARKET PLAYERS  (POSSIBLE) OBJECTIVES  TOOLS  IMPACT
 SHIPPING COMPANIES Þ Profit maximisation
Þ Market share
Þ Control over logistics chain
Þ Tariff
Þ Cost control (capacity, volume,
time, co-operation, ...)
Þ Marketing
Þ Range and level of service
Þ Larger vessels
Þ Rationalisation of sailing
schedules
Þ Alliances and consortia
Þ Dedicated terminals
 STEVEDORES Þ Profit maximisation
Þ Long term customer loyalty, incl..
through logistic services and value-
added activities (eg. stuffing and
stripping, storage, pre-delivery
inspection, ….)
Þ Price setting
Þ Technology of goods handling
aimed at speed, quality.
Þ Range and level of service
Þ Returns to scale for terminals
Þ Industrial logistics
 HINTERLAND TRANSPORT
MODES
Þ Profit maximisation
Þ Market share
Þ Tariffs
Þ Speed
Þ Flexibility
Þ Capacity
Þ Fierce modal competition
 PORT AUTHORITIES Þ Contribution to cost minimisation
for logistics chain (both through
port dues and time costs)
Þ Maximisation cargo handling
(public company)
Þ maximisation of profit (private
company)
Þ Maritime access
Þ Land and concession policy (cf.
Reserve capacity of land)
Þ Socio-economic negotiations
Þ Price setting
Þ Further information maritime
access
Þ Guaranteeing of social and
economic stability
Þ Concession policy affects
industrial structure)
 FREIGHT FORWARDERS AND
SHIPPING AGENTS
Þ Profit maximisation
Þ Customer loyalty
Þ Diversification (eg. added logistics
services.)
Þ Tariffs
Þ Range and level of service
Þ All-in-one price for door to door
transport
Þ Strong dependency (in both
directions)
 OWNER OF GOODS Þ Minimisation of total  generalised
logistics costs (incl. time cost)
Þ Negotiating power (dependent
on availability of alternatives)
Þ Scale increase (positive impact
on negotiating position
Þ Greater volatility
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Consequences For Port Competition In Europe
It appears from the foregoing that, in recent years, many kinds of co-operative
arrangements  have developed in the maritime and port industry. In most cases, the
initiative was taken by shipping companies, though other market players were also
involved. But what impact do these developments have on inter- and intra-port
competition?
Some agreements between lines are designed to achieve cost reduction through the
relocation and centralisation of goods flows yielding economies of scale.  The synergies
and cost reduction presuppose thorough rationalisation, to which the port component is
expected to make a substantial contribution. Shipping companies are quite aware of this.
The greater transhipment volume gives the shipping line(s) in question a greater
negotiating power vis-à-vis port authorities and cargo handlers.
Such a concentration of cargo may occur in a terminal that is also accessible to other
shipping companies, or it may happen at a so-called dedicated terminal. Port authorities
may be interested in committing to a dedicated terminal in the interest of efficiency or
to guarantee customer loyalty. Dedicated terminals have been provided recently to
Maersk in Rotterdam and to MSC in Antwerp). However, it is a development that raises
a number of important questions for port authorities: Is there, for example, a danger that
a certain shipping company may monopolise (part of) the port infrastructure? Is there a
risk of distortion of competition and idle capacity? To what extent are earlier
investments by local cargo handlers affected negatively, for example by a regrouping of
activities at a different terminal? Is there danger of cross-subsidising of loss-making
shipping activities? Is there danger of insufficient productivity through possible over
capacity?
It remains necessary, therefore, to keep a close eye on the response of other players to
new arrangements. For example, other shipping companies will not be inclined to have
their vessels handled at terminals that are controlled by potential competitors. A
consequence, therefore, may be the diversion of traffic to terminals in other ports. A
port authority may thus have had the intention of increasing its competitiveness by
building new dedicated transhipment infrastructure, but the net result, in terms of TEUs
handled, could still be negative. Moreover, the port authority also runs the risk that
future traffic evolution will become a function of the competitiveness and strategy of a
limited number of shipping companies.
Cargo handlers, too, have been responding to these developments. For example, in
Antwerp where the port authority was willing to dedicate a new tidal terminal to a
shipping company, ,the stevedoring company Hessenatie entered into a 50/50 joint
venture involving MSC.
At the same time, cargo handlers may themselves pursue an expansionist policy,
acquiring stakes in foreign counterparts and participating in the joint management of
terminals. This is facilitated by the privatisation of port activities. Perhaps these
developments are best illustrated by an Italian example. Before the 1994 reform,
terminals in Italy used to be under public management. After the reforms, some were
privatised. This was followed by constant changes to management structures, so that by
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mid-1999 most large container terminals are controlled by major international groups as
shown in Table 3.
In an obvious response to the concentration trend that is unfolding in container line
services, a number of terminal operators have opted for scale increases and a fresh
financial input. An example is the new shareholder structure of the cargo handler ECT
in Rotterdam, with the entry of Hutchison Whampoa from Hong Kong (50%) and the
stake of the City of Rotterdam (30%). Both of these investments are potentially
controversial. On the one hand, the port authority of Rotterdam has taken a share in one
of the port’s own terminals, which inevitably raises questions in the minds of other
cargo handlers (and not exclusively in the container business). The European
Commission is conducting an enquiry into whether Hutchison Whampoa, which now
has stakes in three important Northern European ports (Rotterdam, Felixstowe and
Thamesport), might control too large a share of container handling operations. Such a
potentially dominant position may give rise to undue constrains on competition.
The changing relationships between shipping lines and port terminals is raising new
questions about the potential benefits from more efficient operations from better
integration and the potential costs of reduced competition.  Whether competition is in
fact reduced depends on whether sufficient competition will exist among separate
integrated chains and on the fate of shipping companies that lack such facilities as
dedicated terminals.
Equally striking is the battle for inland transport services. In the past, shipping
companies used to organise joint transport by block trains. Cargo handlers were not
directly involved. But this appears to be changing: the cargo handler ECT, for example,
has developed a network of inland terminals (including in Duisburg, Germany, and in
Willebroek, Belgium) in an effort to gain some control over inland transport and to hold
on to certain goods flows.
At the same time, efforts are being made to provide better integrated services in the
hinterland transport sector. An example is the takeover of the German firm THL by the
Belgian railway company NMBS. NMBS also operates a container terminal in Antwerp
under a joint venture with Noordnatie stevedoring company. These examples illustrate
the great significance that is attributed nowadays to inland transport services. It also
shows how other developments affect the ability of shipping companies to take full
control of logistics chains.
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Table 3: Control of some Italian (container) terminals (06/1999)
Terminal Control Investments planned
Medcenter Container Terminal
(MCT), Gioia Tauro, Italy
Contship Italia (100%)
Eurokai has a 33.4% stake in Contship
Italia
Six new post-panamax cranes at MCT
over the next two years, plus 28
straddle carriers
La Spezia Container Terminal
(LSCT), La Spezia, Italy
Contship Italia (control stake)
Eurokai has a 33.4% stake in Contship
Extending quay, adding ship-to-shore
and yard cranes at LSCT
Mediterranean International
Transhipment Hub (MITH),
Cagliari, Italy (the new terminal
will trade under the name of
“Cagliari International
Container Terminal”)
P&O Ports (32%), Gruppo Investimenti
Portuali (32%). Remaining 36% is shared
between PTM (parastatal organisation in
Sardinia) and Compagnia Portuale di
Cagliari (local stevedoring company)
Ready for use in January 2000.
Th  terminal infrastructure is now
almost complete, and includes 1,700
of continuos quay with a minimum
draught of 14m. The container
stacking yard of 40ha is paved.  Two
post-panamax gantry cranes are in
place. Additional handling equipment
will be installed over the next 12
months
Taranto Container Terminal
(TCT), Taranto, Italy
Evergreen
A 60-year concession agreement with the
Taranto Port Authority
The already existing quay, over
2000m in length, and a water depth of
15m alongside, has been converted for
container operations.  The process will
be developed in phases.   Completion
of the three-berth Phase I of TCT is
scheduled for early 2000.
Molo VII, Trieste, Italy ECT
A 30-year concession agreement
No immediate plans for major
investments in equipment or
infrastructure.  The terminal already
has eight ship-to-shore cranes on
2000m of quay, a draught along-side
of 18m, and a container stacking area
of 35ha.
Voltri Terminal Europa (VTE),
Genoa, Italy
PSA (60% in Sinport): PSA network
includes already VTE in Genoa, Vecon in
Venice and the smaller Roma Terminal
Containers in Civitavecchia.
In January 1998 PSA signed an agreement
with Sogespar, a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Fiat group, under which it purchased a
60% equity stake in Sinport.  Sinport owns
95% of VTE
Extension of quay and addition of new
ship-to-shore cranes at VTE
Venice container terminal
(Vecon), Venice, Italy
PSA (60% in Sinport): PSA network
includes already VTE in Genoa, Vecon in
Venice and the smaller Roma Terminal
Containers in Civitavecchia.
Sinport acquired  a controlling 53% in
Vecon, Venice, following the sale of Vecon
by the Venice Port Authority
Terminal Darsena Toscana,
Leghorn, Italy
To be privatised.
At the present the terminal is managed by
Compagnia Impresa Lavoratori Portuali
(stevedores) and Sintermar (Neri, D’Alesio,
Fremura). There are interests of PSA.
Sources: Containerisation International (CI) and Port Development International  (PDI)
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Conclusion
This study examines the extent and form of co-operative agreements in the maritime
and port industries. It shows that shipping companies, consortia and alliances have
acquired a more powerful negotiating position vis-à-vis port authorities, stevedores and
inland transport firms.  At the same time, the other parties have responded to the
changing challenges and opportunities in international transport and logistics markets.
Some port authorities have gone so far as to make dedicated terminals available to their
principal customers. As yet, it is unclear what the ultimate effect of this particular
development will be. Goods handlers, for their part, reacted in different ways, including
the establishment of joint ventures for operating dedicated terminals, an expansionist
policy with regard to other terminals, and by attracting fresh capital input from
international groups, which may lead to problems in terms of market dominance and
conflicts of interest.
A result of these developments is continuing shifts in the balance of the markets. The
ultimate result is not yet clear. However a number of conclusions are possible.
There is a trend unfolding in the maritime and port industries towards ever-greater
control of the logistics chain through various forms of co-operation (strategic alliances,
mergers, etc.). They include both vertical agreements along the logistics chain and
horizontal agreements among suppliers of similar services, particularly shipping
companies. These developments bring with them a danger of preferential treatment,
conflicts of interests and market dominance.
However, the crucial question remains; what role will the port authorities be able to
play in the future? If the concept of the logistics chain is indeed translated into a more
pronounced vertical integration of shipping companies, stevedores, hinterland transport
modes and (possibly) shipping agents, what will be the role of port authorities? Will
port authorities become fully-fledged partners in the logistics chain, will their
involvement be restricted to a supporting role (safety, land-use and concession policy),
or might they disappear from the scene entirely? In order to find answers to these
questions, further research, in particular more disaggregated empirical research, is
urgently required. Research is needed that provides insights into the cost structure of the
individual market players as well as the logistics chain as a whole.
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